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In this paper I examine Jeff McMahan’s arguments for his claim that we are not human organisms, and 
the arguments of Derek Parfit to the same effect in a recent paper. McMahan uses these arguments to 
derive conclusions concerning the moral status of embryos and PVS patients. My claim will be that 
neither thinker has successfully shown that we are not human beings, and therefore these arguments do 
not establish the ethical conclusions that McMahan has sought to draw from the arguments in respect 
of the moral status of embryos and PVS patients.  
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I. Introduction 
Jeff McMahan has claimed that we are not human organisms.1 He advances two arguments for this 
claim, the aim of the arguments being to establish a number of moral consequences that he believes to 
follow from it. One example of such a moral consequence concerns the permissibility of embryonic 
stem cell research. Many people believe we were once embryos. Although this belief can be disputed 
on other grounds, one important ground for disputing that belief is that we are not essentially human 
organisms at all. Assuming that it is wrong to kill “us” (he calls us persons (2002, 440)) but not wrong 
to kill organisms, then, if we are not human organisms, and the embryo is a human organism, it would 
follow2 that it would not be wrong to destroy embryos for the purpose of embryonic stem cell research. 
A second example of a moral consequence McMahan draws from his two arguments concerns the 
permissibility, in some circumstances, of procuring organs from permanent vegetative state (PVS) 
patients. McMahan claims that although the human organism remains alive when I fall into a state of 
PVS, I, by contrast, am dead (2002, 440). We would therefore not be killing persons if we killed the 
organism in order to procure its organs, or if we procured organs thereby causing the human organism 
to die. If it is wrong to kill persons, but not to kill organisms, then it would follow that it may be morally 
permissible to procure these organs (2002, 447ff). The two arguments McMahan advances for the claim 
that we are not human organisms have become influential, being invoked and applied very recently in 
a paper published in Philosophy by Derek Parfit (2012). Parfit made the second of the arguments famous 
in Reasons and Persons (1984).  
In this paper, I discuss and challenge the two arguments that McMahan advances in support of all these 
claims. My aim is to show that McMahan has not established that we are not human organisms, and so 
has not established the case he makes for the permissibility of embryonic stem cell research and organ 
procurement from PVS patients. If we are to explain why these practices are permissible, some other 
explanation must be found than that offered by McMahan. It is not my intention, however, to sketch 
any such alternative account here.   
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II. McMahan’s two arguments for the conclusion we are not 
human organisms 
It is a characteristic feature of philosophical thinking since Socrates to put into question that which we 
take to be self-evident. Most philosophers consider this to be a virtue of the subject. Nothing should be 
taken for granted and left unquestioned. No belief or assumption should be immune to philosophical 
reflection. One such belief or assumption that most of us would think is self-evident is the belief that 
we are human organisms. McMahan’s arguments are meant to put this belief or assumption into 
question. We are not human organisms, but the conscious part of that organism: 
A human organism is conscious only by virtue of having a conscious part. We are that 
part...The label I use to describe what we essentially are is “embodied mind” 
(McMahan, 2007, 186). 
Explaining what he means by “embodied mind”, McMahan states: 
According to the Embodied Mind Account, the criterion of personal identity is physical 
and minimal functional continuity of the brain (McMahan, 2002, 69). 
He also adds that, when referring to “the criterion of personal identity”, his use of the word “brain” 
should be understood as shorthand for “those regions of the brain in which consciousness is realised” 
(McMahan, 2002, 67). 
In his recent paper, “We Are Not Human Beings”, Derek Parfit (2012), building on McMahan’s 
arguments,3 also denies that we are human beings. Indeed, not only are we not human beings, we are 
not even animals – we are not an organism of any kind on both Parfit’s and McMahan’s view. Instead, 
Parfit says, we are the “embodied part” of human beings, and hence, of animals. Although my main 
focus will be on McMahan’s arguments, I shall discuss some of Parfit’s recent arguments when 
discussing McMahan’s second argument below, since he endorses McMahan’s account and describes 
it as the best form of what he calls “the embodied part view”, the view that Parfit himself defends.  
II.A McMahan’s First Argument 
McMahan’s first argument for the claim that we are not human organisms relies on cases of dicephalic 
twinning. This is an incomplete form of conjoined twinning "in which two heads, each with its own 
brain and its own separate mental life, sit atop a single body” (McMahan, 2007, 182, emphasis added).4 
McMahan points out that, in dicephalic twinning (as with the Hensel twins), there is very little 
duplication of organs below the neck and only one circulatory system, one metabolic system, one 
reproductive system and one immune system. This leads him to conclude that, “[i]n these cases, there 
are two persons but only one human organism” (McMahan, 2007, 182).  
It follows, he claims, that none of us are human organisms, for if we were, then there would have to be 
two organisms present in the case of the Hensel twins, rather than one, but there is only one (McMahan, 
2007, 183). That being so, it follows a fortiori that nobody is killed when an embryo is destroyed 
(McMahan, 2007, 183, 186).5 
However, McMahan’s conclusion is too quick. His certainty that we would say that there is only one 
organism may come6 from his conflating the organism with the trunk,7 which the twins share, when he 
writes that "two heads sit atop one body". There is one trunk, but it does not follow that there is only 
one body, where “body” means organism, for of course the body in this sense includes rather than 
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excludes the head! And there are two heads, not one.8 The organism and its trunk are not identical; 
rather, the trunk is part of the organism. The fact that the organism, then, includes two heads makes it 
possible for us to regard the twins as two organisms conjoined, rather than one organism. Indeed, our 
very use of the terms “twins”, “each”, “the girls” etc., shows that we regard there to be two incompletely 
severed organisms here.  
McMahan could reply that this is not so. He might insist instead that these terms show that there are 
two persons present, but not that there are two organisms present here. But this reply fails, for two 
reasons. First, it fails because it begs the question by stipulating that when we refer to the “twins”, to 
“each”, to “the girls” and to “Abigail and Brittany” we are only referring to persons not living human 
beings. But nothing is ever proven by a mere stipulation or decree. Second, it fails because it ignores 
the complexity of the girls’ situation. For a start, not all organs are shared. For instance, in addition to 
the heads, although many organs are shared, some, such as the heart, lungs, and stomach are not: they 
each have a heart, a set of lungs, and a stomach.9 In addition, each has her own spine. Also, one whole 
side (including arm and leg) is controlled by one of the twins, while the other is controlled by the other, 
and each does not have feeling on the other side. It is, of course, true that other organs are shared. But 
of itself, that is not a sufficient reason for concluding that there is only one organism and two persons; 
if we were inclined to regard the sharing of the organs as a reason for concluding that there is only one 
organism, there is no reason why we should not also be committed to regarding the sharing of the organs 
as a reason for concluding that there is one person. That we do not do so – that we treat them as girls 
rather than as one girl, that we give them two names, etc – shows that we don’t regard the fact that they 
are conjoined as decisive. As noted above, McMahan cannot appeal to the fact that there are separate 
heads here to conclude there are two persons but one body without begging the question.  
In addition to his apparent conflation of the body (in the sense of the whole organism including the 
head) and the trunk or torso (which excludes the head), McMahan may be pushed into concluding that 
there is only one organism (but two persons) because he refers to there being one biological mass,10 and 
so believes that they are not numerically distinct entities. In that regard, the criterion for a single 
substance as being one spatio-temporal continuant is taken by McMahan to be decisive. But even if we 
accepted that there is one biological mass here, it does not follow that we cannot refer to two, only 
partially severed organisms. Just as we can regard the squares in a bar of chocolate as numerically 
distinct squares of the one bar even before we break them off, so we can regard the twins as two 
organisms, even if we cannot regard them as two separate organisms.11  
These points do not rule out the possibility of borderline cases – at least imaginary ones. The fact that 
the Hensel twins share sexual organs and that, if one dies the other will die simultaneously are factors 
that McMahan considers relevant to his conclusion (McMahan, 2002, 36-37).12 He also imagines a 
variation, which he calls a severe form of dicephalic twinning, where everything is shared below the 
neck (McMahan, 2002, 38-39). He takes this to be a clear-cut case of there being one organism, but two 
persons. But this conclusion is a recommendation on his part about how we should classify such an 
acute case, were it ever to become instantiated. We might, however, in such a case, refer to the entity 
as a human being with two heads. If, for instance, one head is not controlling one side – one arm and 
one leg – with the other controlling the other side (so that there has not been any need to learn to 
coordinate movements, as with the Hensel sisters), that might be a decisive reason for classifying the 
entity as a single organism with two heads. But for the same reason, we can say that there is a single 
person with two heads. There is no reason whatsoever to separate the concept of a person from the 
concept of a human organism here. There is no compulsion to decide the issue in the way that McMahan 
assumes it would be decided. But in any event, McMahan thinks that the advantage of his first argument 
over his second argument is that it is not a hypothetical example as is the brain transplant of his second 
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argument. But with the variation (where we are to imagine a severe but hitherto unknown case of 
dicephalic twinning), we are in the realm of hypotheticals, and so it is best now to turn to the second 
argument, which is a much stronger argument. Before doing so, however, it is worth stressing that, 
unlike his hypothetical severe case, the case of the Hensel sisters is not to my mind a borderline case 
where we might say that there is one person with two heads or two organisms. Still less is it the kind of 
case that warrants McMahan’s claim that there is one organism but two persons. Nothing in the example 
shows that this way of classifying the Hensel sisters is remotely compelling. But even if it did – even if 
we accepted that we should classify the sisters as a single organism and two persons – this would not 
show that the rest of us are not human organisms. It would merely show that we have chosen to 
categorise the sisters differently from how we categorise the rest of us.13  
If these considerations are correct, then McMahan’s first argument does not show that we are not human 
organisms, and consequently cannot show that we were never human embryos (or that PVS patients are 
dead). It is, in fact, merely a recommendation on his part about how the twins should be classified and, 
stemming from this, about how we should classify our relationship to our bodies, fuelled no doubt partly 
by his conflation of the trunk and the organism, and partly by his assumption that “organism” should 
be defined simply as one biological spatio-temporal continuant (which ignores the possibility that two 
organisms exist, only partially separated). 
II.B McMahan’s Second Argument 
McMahan also offers a second argument for his claim that we are not human organisms. Suppose you 
and your twin have an accident, and your body is destroyed but not your brain, but your twin's brain is 
destroyed, but not his body. The only way to save you is to transplant your brain into your twin's body. 
Suppose this is done. "Most of us", he claims, "believe that the person who then wakes up in that body 
is you. But if you were a human organism, you would now be the dead organism from which your brain 
was extracted" (McMahan, 2007, 182). It follows we are not human organisms, according to McMahan.  
However, the thought experiment – endorsed also by Peter Singer (2009, 160-161) – does not show that 
we are not human organisms. Instead, it redefines14 the word “person” and the concept of personal 
identity15 exclusively in terms of psychological continuity and brain identity, allowing bodily identity 
to drop out as a defining feature. As Wittgenstein pointed out: 
...the ordinary use of the word “person” is what one might call a composite use suitable 
under the ordinary circumstances. If I assume...that those circumstances are changed, 
the application of the term “person”....has thereby changed... (Wittgenstein, 1958, 62). 
The intuitions McMahan refers to (“most of us believe…”) are therefore no more than a hunch about 
how we might redefine or refine our use of the word “person” – what is to be a person and therewith 
what it is to be the same person – should such a science fiction scenario become a genuine possibility, 
with the resultant person who wakes up claiming to remember doing things that I did.16 But our current 
concepts of person and personal identity include both bodily identity and psychological continuity. As 
Peter Hacker notes, if you woke up tomorrow and seemed to recognise all the places I know, and seemed 
to know all the people I know, that would not make you me (Hacker, 2007, 308).17 We may, of course, 
say of someone after severe amnesia following a coma, “he is not the same person; he is not himself”, 
but this can be paraphrased to mean “he’s not behaving as he normally behaves” or that he is behaving 
"out of character", as we say. If the police knocked on our door and asked us to identify the severe 
amnesiac, we wouldn’t say we were unsure if he was one and the same person we thought he was 
because he is behaving abnormally and we cannot see his brain. Physical appearance and identity of the 
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human being, i.e. of the organism, over time18 is a criterion of identity under our current concepts, and, 
in cases of doubt, the police can rely on finger-printing to determine the identity of the person 
concerned. And that shows that the identity of the organism over time is partly constitutive of what we 
mean by “the same person”, “him”, etc. But by suggesting that the identity of the organism over time 
is already irrelevant by appeal to the well-known brain transplant example, McMahan leaves this 
criterion out of his account, not realising that he has subtly dropped one of our current criteria for the 
identity and identification of persons.  
McMahan could respond that the criteria I have mentioned are criteria for the organism in which I (the 
“conscious part of my brain” on his view) am “housed”, and so are criteria for the same organism rather 
than, strictly speaking, for the same person. Since the organism and the person coincide in normal 
circumstances, those criteria enable us to identify the same person. But it does not follow, McMahan 
could continue, that the person and the organism are identical, only that they coincide or, as he puts it, 
that one “houses” or “occupies”19 the other. We can nonetheless separate the two, in principle. We can 
imagine, for example, that the severe amnesiac I referred to above is an amnesiac not simply by reason 
of a medical condition but because he has had his brain replaced by a different brain, unknown to us. If 
we rely only on his physical appearance, then of course we would not believe him to be a different 
person. But we would be wrong. This response would, however, itself be appealing to the new concept 
of what it is to be a person – namely sufficient continuity of those parts of the brain in which 
consciousness is realised – and so does not answer my contention that McMahan is merely 
recommending a redefinition of our concept of person in the light of what “most people are inclined to 
say” in response to a mere thought experiment.  
Could McMahan cheerfully accept this? He could, but only if that possibility (the transfer of my whole 
brain to the brainless body of my twin) was itself realised and so not only scientifically possible but 
practised. If such operations began to become routine, that may well indeed bring about a shift in our 
concepts of what it is to be a person and the same person. He can’t cheerfully accept this, however, 
merely on the basis of the thought experiment. This is because there are other possibilities that would 
make us reach different views and would result in our concepts being adjusted in different ways. A well-
known example is the single hemisphere transfer. In this case, unlike the previous case, only half of my 
brain is transplanted, with my other half remaining. Assuming I retain my capacity for consciousness 
(as can happen after a hemispherectomy, a radical surgical solution to severe epilepsy), and assuming 
that the brainless organism to which my other half is transplanted subsequently wakes up, the question 
is which one is now me? There is enough continuity of the brain in both cases for McMahan’s criterion 
to be satisfied (enough parts of the brain in which consciousness "is realised"),20 but our concepts of 
person and personal identity break down in this case. As David Wiggins has suggested,21 we might 
instead regard me in this scenario as a universal with two instantiations (Wiggins, 2001, 227). 
Expanding the logic of Wiggins’s point, if it were possible for me to create cloned brains by somatic 
cell nuclear transfer and then program the resulting brains with my memories,22 we could multiply the 
instantiations. I would then no longer die but could instead only become extinct. Here we have a 
perspicuous case where our concepts of identity and difference break down – with a suggestion about 
how they would adjust in such a world where these possibilities became routine. But the adjustment is 
different in this case from that which would occur on the transfer of the whole brain to a brainless twin.  
McMahan could, of course, concede this point but insist that on both scenarios (the single brain transfer 
and the half hemisphere transfer) we can still maintain that we are not human organisms, but merely 
the conscious part of one. But the point is that, on the second scenario, we are not the conscious part of 
one. Rather, we are a universal with multiple instantiations (even if only two such instantiations), and 
the concept of death no longer applies to us, but rather the concept of becoming extinct. What this shows 
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is that we cannot rely on thought experiments alone – logical possibilities (assuming they do express 
logical possibilities) – as the basis for claiming to have discovered, as McMahan does, what it is we 
essentially are. For different logically possible scenarios call for different responses to that question. In 
each case, the scenario requires a different radical adjustment in our concepts. So it is only when 
possibilities become more than logical – when some possibilities become actual – that our concepts and 
our self-understanding would really shift; they don’t shift merely by thinking through hypotheticals; 
rather, we discover only the conditions under which our concepts might break down (Hacker, 2007, 
309) and so might, if the scenario became realised, require decisions about how they should henceforth 
be altered and applied, together with different ethical conclusions about our obligations to one-another.  
I contend that these remarks are enough to respond to McMahan’s second argument. However, 
McMahan might still insist that, in both of the alternative scenarios I have discussed, the arguments 
show the brain retains a central role. It is not as though we would reach similar conclusions if our bodies 
could duplicate but our brain did not. We could imagine, for instance, that our brain could control more 
than one body.23 We might, as Wittgenstein once suggested, be able to feel toothache in someone else’s 
tooth or we might be able to control their entire brainless body and force the body to do the shopping, 
cleaning, etc, while I (the body in which my brain is “housed”) continue to read McMahan’s Ethics of 
Killing in my armchair. In such a case, we might say that I have several bodies,24 can be in more than 
one place at once, etc. But the converse does not seem to hold. We can imagine four brains attached to 
the one body, each “housed” in separate heads – a four-headed man. If each head communicates to the 
other, argues and debates with the other, do we not have four persons in one body?25 This point returns 
us, though, to the first argument and the criticisms I made in that context would then apply. In short, 
these further variations remain logical possibilities and it is not at all clear how our concepts would or 
should shift in these cases were they to become regular or routine actualities. We might want to know, 
for example, exactly why there are four heads. It would be a relevant factor, for instance, if this resulted 
from incomplete embryo splitting or whether, instead, scientists genetically modified an embryo so that 
it could grow four heads rather than one head. If the latter, the incomplete severance of twins argument 
I relied on in the previous section could not apply and this would be a factor enabling us to decide which 
way to go in terms of how we now conceive identity. Once again, these points only illustrate that 
different options are open to us, and so illustrate the Wittgensteinian point that “personality hasn’t got 
one legitimate heir only” (Wittgenstein, 1958, 62).  
Although I believe that these points answer McMahan’s second argument, the thought experiment of 
the single brain transplant is widely used in debates about personal identity and personhood, and has 
been invoked once again more recently by Derek Parfit who famously deployed it in his earlier 
influential work, Reasons and Persons. It has also been invoked in the context of debates about death 
in organ donation (Khushf, 2010). I shall therefore now devote more attention to this particular version 
of the argument and, in particular, to Derek Parfit’s very recent arguments involving the transplantation 
of my cerebrum to another body. 
II.C Further Analysis of the Second Argument 
I have argued, following Peter Hacker,26 that the famous twin thought experiment only highlights 
indeterminate areas of our concept of “person” and “same person”. These are areas in which application 
of these concepts is not clear because they do not concern the standard cases in which the word “person” 
or “same person” is normally applied in everyday life, but rather concern fanciful and far-fetched 
cases.27 Our concept is not designed to cover every conceivable case but functions to enable 
communication in standard (and perhaps some periphery) cases that obtain in our actual world. The 
possibility of a single brain transfer from my body to the body of my twin is only one of several different 
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possibilities that might all be extreme enough to result in a shift in concepts – and a different shift in 
each case. In the case of the single transfer, if the possibilities of transplantation McMahan imagines 
should ever become possible, and start to become widely practised,28 a decision about how the concept 
of “person” is to be applied might be necessary at that point.29 It might be that we would decide to apply 
the terms “person”, “same person”, etc., by disregarding the criterion of bodily identity. But the concept 
of person would then have changed.30 It would not therefore show, pace McMahan, that we, i.e. persons, 
are not, on the current definition of person, organisms, and so could not show that we were not once 
embryos, or that PVS patients are dead.  
 
(a) Essential and inessential criteria? 
 
McMahan might respond by claiming that these points ignore the fact that, among the various criteria 
for the application of the term “person”, some are essential, but others are merely accidental. Indeed, 
Derek Parfit has considered the finger print criterion and makes remarks that might seem to respond to 
the Wittgensteinian objection. In the case of a conflict between that criterion and the brain and 
psychological continuity criterion, it seems obvious that the latter is essential, whereas the former is not 
– in other words, the former is more a symptom of identity than a criterion of it. For example, suppose 
a surgeon could remould the fingertips of someone’s fingers, and did so. In such a case, Parfit says, we 
would still maintain that the person would continue to exist, with the same brain and psychology, though 
with different finger prints (Parfit, 2012, 10).31 But would we similarly say the same thing if someone’s 
brain were removed, and they were kept alive on life support? Parfit contends that we would not (Parfit, 
2012, 10). If correct, then Parfit could say that, on our current concept of “person”, the person whose 
finger prints are changed remains one and the same person – indeed, this fact is already recorded in how 
I have just expressed this very point (“the person whose finger prints are changed”). By contrast, on our 
current concept of “person” we would not say that the person who has had a full brain transplant remains 
the same person – indeed, for that very reason, we would not say “the person who has had a brain 
transplant” at all, for that assumes that one can remain the same person with a brain transplant, but the 
transplant example is meant precisely to show that this is not the case. Does this not show that our 
criteria of identity already record what is essential and what is accidental to being a person? If this were 
not the case, then why is it that so many of us feel that the brain is the one organ in our body that we 
would not want to have replaced via a transplant? A kidney or heart transplant does not raise any issues 
of identity but surely even if we hesitate or are unsure, the very prospect of needing a brain transplant 
would raise in us the question of whether it would truly be I who survive the transplant or whether or 
not it is actually someone else who inherits my body. If so, it might be concluded that the 
Wittgensteinian points just made would fail, because they would have ignored the fact that some criteria 
for the application of “same person” seem essential, while others do not. 
In reply to this point, we can begin by noting that some of the intuitions relied on by McMahan and 
Parfit in the thought experiment seem to work because it is the body of my twin to which my brain is 
transferred and only the immediate circumstances of the transplant are described. Neither thinker 
countenances the possibility that we might regard the resultant being as a hybrid, that is, as a different 
person from either A or B. But what if the brain of an unrelated female was removed and my brain was 
transplanted to her female body? Is the resulting person still me? It would be controversial to say that 
our sex is not an essential feature of our identity, of who we are.32 Could we not classify the resultant 
person as a hybrid of me and the female whose brain has been discarded? Is the resultant person a male 
trapped in a woman’s body, or are they a female?  
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Parfit, at least, imagines his head being attached to Bernard Williams’s body, and so offers a non-twin 
example. However, he believes that our analysis would nonetheless remain the same. But the way he 
sets up his thought experiment partly forces the conclusion he wants us to draw onto us. Parfit invites 
us to imagine that we know both Parfit and Williams personally. Imagine that Parfit’s head is 
transplanted onto Williams’s body, and that we visit the resultant person in the post-operative recovery 
room (Parfit, 2012, 9). Seeing only Parfit’s head on the pillow – the body to which it is attached being 
covered by sheets – we hear Parfit talking and assume that it is indeed Parfit who is talking. Parfit 
contends that, even once the sheets are lifted and we see that Parfit’s head has been attached to 
Williams’s body, we would not conclude that we were not, after all, talking with Parfit. But the 
description of the circumstances makes that conclusion compelling. It leaves out other factors which 
are relevant, and, more importantly, it ignores the possibility that we might come to revise that intuition 
and persist in a state of uncertainty, sometimes thinking that the resultant being is Parfit, and sometimes 
withdrawing that belief.  
First, assume, as Parfit later invites us to do, that only the cerebrum is transplanted. Parfit maintains that 
our conclusion would remain the same if only the cerebrum is transplanted onto Williams’s brain stem, 
on the ground that “it is our cerebrum on which all of our distinctive mental activity depends” (Parfit, 
2012, 11). Assuming that this claim is accurate,33 then the same conclusion is said to follow, namely, 
that we would conclude that the person who wakes up is Parfit. Yet the resultant person, with Parfit’s 
cerebrum, would not look like Parfit, and certainly would not sound like him. This may give us pause 
before we assumed we are talking with Parfit – even if Williams’s body remains covered by the sheets. 
Second, assume that the transplant happened when they were much younger. I might know that 
Williams is a brilliant sprinter, and was close, at one stage, to turning professional. Parfit, on the other 
hand, was an awful sprinter, so much so that he and Williams used to joke about the fact that this was 
the one competition at which Williams could give Parfit a good beating. When the resultant being who 
wakes up following the operation has suitably convalesced, and starts running like Williams did, I might 
now hesitate in assuming that I had been talking to Parfit on that day. I might now come to believe that 
“Parfit” is actually a hybrid. Further, conditions in Williams’s body that Parfit never had may make 
“Parfit” irritated and hot tempered, like Williams was. Parfit, however, was never hot tempered in this 
way. Would it be irrational for me to hesitate, here, to continue with my assumption that I was talking 
that day in the post-operative theatre with Parfit, and not some hybrid? Once these other factors are 
introduced, I think we are likely to be less certain – to change our minds and to conclude that we do not 
really know whether the resultant person is Parfit or not: we might instead decide that this is some heir 
of Parfit, closely related, but nonetheless distinct. Changes in personality, the acquisition of different 
interests which are aligned to those Williams had, such as sprinting, may lead me to this conclusion. To 
be clear, the point of these other examples is not to suggest that we definitely would not say that the 
resulting person waking up is Parfit. Rather, it is only to suggest that saying so is not the only option 
available, that it is not inevitable, or already dictated by, our current concept of personal identity. 
Parfit might respond by saying that we are certainly not tempted, here, to call the resultant person 
Williams. It is one thing to be uncertain about whether the resultant person is Parfit, but quite another 
to be uncertain about whether it is Parfit or Williams. None of the above examples – the sprinting, the 
irritability that were traits of Williams – makes us consider the possibility that it might actually be 
Williams who wakes up. This is true. It is not my contention that we would hesitate about whether the 
resultant being could be Williams rather than Parfit. My contention is only that we might decide that 
the resultant person is neither Parfit nor Williams. But I do not need that stronger contention to argue 
that we are human organisms, rather than brains or embodied brains. If the weaker possibility is open, 
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then it follows that we might still consider that we are human organisms, even if the science fiction 
scenario becomes possible. 
Given these points, the Wittgensteinian claim that the term “personality hasn’t got one legitimate heir 
only” (Wittgenstein, 1958, 62) still stands: we can vary the facts, as we have done with these different 
thought experiments, to show that different ways of applying the term “person” under those various 
circumstances become possible. Parfit himself concedes this, when recognising that our intuitions about 
what we would say in the case of a whole brain transplant take a completely different turn if, instead of 
imagining a whole brain transplant, we imagine one half of my brain going to one body, and the other 
half going to another, different body (Parfit, 1984). The transitivity of identity rules out my being 
identical to another person, so which resultant person is me? We cannot say – but as noted above, 
following Wiggins, our concept of what it is for “me” to be a person may shift so that I am regarded as 
a universal with two instantiations here. Yet if only one half of the brain is transplanted, and the other 
half is destroyed, we seem more tempted to say that the resultant person is me. These problems might 
themselves form good grounds for concluding, as I have suggested above, that the resultant person is 
neither the person from whose body the brain is transplanted, nor the person to whose body the brain 
is transplanted. On such a view, the problem caused by the transitivity of identity would not arise. Once 
again, however, only a decision will settle the issue – and which decision we make will depend on the 
possibilities that become standard. 
 
(b) A questionable empirical assumption – ignoring the vertical plasticity of the 
brain stem 
 
One final point is worth making. As noted above, Parfit’s latest work involves imagining only the 
cerebrum removed to another person’s body – the brain stem being left intact. Parfit says that, on this 
experiment, if our brain stem continued to maintain the functioning of our heart, lung, and most other 
organs, the human animal would continue to exist, though in an unconscious, vegetative state, or coma 
(Parfit, 2012, 11). Yet, Parfit says, “it is our cerebrum on which all of our distinctive mental activity 
depends” (Parfit, 2012, 11). This, he thinks, would make us say that the person goes with the cerebrum 
onto the brain stem and body of the organism to which the cerebrum is transplanted, notwithstanding 
that the organism from which the cerebrum is taken remains alive, supported artificially (Parfit, 2012, 
11). This, he believes, proves that we are not human organisms – for the organism would be left behind, 
while Parfit himself goes with his brain.  
However, this account is based on assumptions that have been challenged scientifically. Franklin Miller 
and Robert Truog have criticised McMahan’s belief that consciousness and mental activity are realised 
in the outer layer of the cerebrum (Miller and Truog, 2012, 88), on the basis that there is evidence that 
consciousness does not require the function of the cerebral hemispheres. If correct, these criticisms 
would also apply to Parfit’s claims. The evidence in question has been reported by Bjorn Merker (2007) 
and Shewmon, Holmes and Byrne (1999).34 Evidence presented in these papers of children born without 
a cortex nevertheless being conscious leads Merker to suggest that “the brainstem mechanisms are 
integral to the constitution of the conscious state” (Merker, 2007, 63). In these hydranencephalic 
children, the brain stem acquires some of the functions of the cerebral cortex, including consciousness 
(Shewmon, Holmes and Byrne, 1999). Indeed, Merker suggests that the fact that bilateral cortical 
damage will typically result in PVS “does not, however, allow us to make an equation between cortical 
function and consciousness, because such damage also inevitably disrupts numerous brainstem 
mechanisms normally in receipt of cortical input” (Merker, 2007, 65, italics added). This suggests that 
a person with an undamaged brain stem might in principle be able to regain some conscious awareness,35 
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and these cases are precisely the cases that are relevant to the transplant examples used by Parfit and 
McMahan. If that were so, the case of the cerebrum transplant would then become akin to the case of 
the transplantation of one of my hemispheres to one awaiting body, with one half retained in my body, 
which, as we have seen, yields no determinate answer as to which of the two beings I am. Indeed, in 
this case, the option that Parfit (whose brain stem acquires some consciousness and whose cerebrum is 
transplanted to Williams’s waiting decerebrate body) should be classified as a universal with two 
instantiations is not available either. For if Parfit’s cerebrum is placed on Williams’s brain stem after 
Williams’s brain stem has regained some consciousness via “vertical plasticity” (Shewmon, Holmes 
and Byrne, 1999, 371) (whereby the brain stem acquires some of the functions that would normally 
require the existence of the cerebral cortex),36 we can only say, once again, that the resulting organism 
is a hybrid of Williams and Parfit. But what if the brain stem left behind in Parfit’s body by Parfit’s 
cerebrum should regain some consciousness at the same time?  For example, Parfit might also regain 
consciousness, in spite of the removal of his upper brain, by means of “vertical plasticity”. We would 
then be much less inclined to say that the person who wakes up when Parfit’s upper brain is transplanted 
onto Williams’s brain stem is Parfit. In other words, the strongest intuition that Parfit and McMahan 
rely on to ground their claim that we are not organisms could in fact turn out to be the weakest. If these 
suggestions are correct, our “intuition” that Parfit would go with his brain, such that Parfit is the one 
who wakes up, attached to Williams’s body, would now not be so great at all.  
Again, these considerations illustrate the point that changes in the facts lead us to different conclusions 
concerning what we would say, that is, about how we might project the concept of “person” into these 
new contexts. The core of our current concept, however, remains unchanged by the imaginary scenarios, 
because we are not in a situation where we must make a decision. Consequently, while it is possible 
that we might, one day, define ourselves as something other than human organisms, this does not show 
that we are not human organisms on our current definition of person.37 
III.  Could McMahan’s Point be Made Independently of the Two 
Arguments Just Criticised? 
I have been claiming that the two arguments McMahan advances in favour of the claim that we are not 
human beings are not successful. I have also claimed that Derek Parfit's more recent arguments for the 
same conclusion are likewise not successful. If my claims are correct, then the ethical conclusions they 
believe to follow from their arguments will not in fact be established.  
It might be objected that, notwithstanding my criticisms of the arguments just discussed, it is 
nonetheless plausible to regard scientists as having discovered that we are our brains or regions of our 
brains in which “consciousness” is realised. Could McMahan’s claims that we are not human organisms, 
but “the conscious part” of human organisms, stand independently of the two arguments I have 
criticised? Without the brain, we cannot be conscious, and so cannot have a personality at all. It seems 
that the brain is essential to our identity in the way that other organs of the body are not.  
This is, of course true, but it does not show that we are “the conscious part of the brain”, but merely 
that those regions of the brain to which McMahan refers are the enabling conditions for the organism 
to be conscious.38 As Hacker notes, while it is true that without a brain we could not think, it is also true 
that without a brain we could not walk, but nobody is tempted to say that it is really the region of the 
brain that walks (Hacker, 2007, 307). Similarly, it is the organism that is conscious, not the brain or 
part of the brain. But couldn’t one insist that the organism is conscious via the brain’s being conscious 
so that, strictly speaking, it is only the brain that is conscious rather than the organism, the organism 
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only being conscious in a derivative sense? If we talk of human beings being conscious, it might be 
said, that is just a shorthand way of referring to their brain or the relevant parts of their brain. Just as 
the human being clasps the cup only by its hand doing so, so the human being thinks only by its brain 
doing so.  
However, in the case of the hand, things are really the other way round. The hand clasps only because 
the human organism moves it and clasps objects with it, so to speak of the hand clasping is really only 
a piece of metonymic substitution. The hand is not the actor or agent, but the human being. So that 
analogy would be misleading. 
 
III.A Behavioural Criteria for Ascribing Being Conscious, Unconscious, Seeing, 
Hearing, Speaking, etc. to a Being 
 
If it were really the brain that is conscious, sees, hears and speaks, then we would need to know what 
the criteria are for the brain’s39 doing these things, as opposed to the organism’s doing them.40 The 
organism is not a property of the brain, but is a substance and so a subject of predication.41 If we say of 
the brain that it sees, we need to know with what it sees, but once we introduce the other organs to solve 
this problem, we have reintroduced the organism.42 When we speak of you or me doing things, such as 
thinking, reflecting on a problem, listening to the lecture, etc, there are behavioural criteria43 I rely on 
to know what you are doing. For example, you can tell me what you think of a certain problem, and I 
can know from that not only what you think of it, but how deeply you have thought about it. I rely on 
what you say, out of your mouth, literally. Similarly, I can tell when you are deep in thought, or if you 
have heard a funny line or appreciated a fine piece of art or poetry, for there are criteria I can go on. Of 
course, these won’t always be satisfied, and pretence is possible. But pretending to think is parasitic on 
thinking in the sense that you would still have to engage in behaviour that makes it look as though you 
are thinking.44 
What are the criteria that we would go on if we were to apply such predicates as “conscious” and 
“conscious of” to brains, instead? Another way of asking the same question is this: how do we know 
that we haven’t merely discovered that the brain is an enabling condition for our doing these things, ie, 
for the human being doing them? 
Could we answer this question by saying that the brain uses the organs to see? But this would be to 
adopt the metaphor that thinkers in favour of the brain as the proper subject of predication reject, of the 
captain steering the ship.45 It would be like saying that the engine uses the body of the car to move.46 
Just as the body of a car is not a puppet for the engine, so the human organism is not a puppet for the 
brain.  
Another attempt could be made to respond to these claims. These claims rely on Wittgenstein’s well-
known dictum that only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) one do we say that 
it has sensations, it sees, hears, is blind, is deaf, is conscious or unconscious (Wittgenstein, 1953, para 
281). But could we not imagine that my brain is taken from my body and temporarily survives in a jar 
until it is placed in the body of a different human organism, while retaining consciousness throughout? 
Here, Parfit could say, we do not need to imagine violating the well-known Wittgensteinian dictum 
when entertaining this possibility. We can avoid ignoring the point that behavioural criteria are a 
precondition for the ascription of these properties to us in the following way: we can say that the 
resultant being can now tell us that they remember being told what would happen to them just prior to 
the brain being removed and remember suddenly being able to speak and feel and see again once the 
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brain was “hooked up” to the new organism. The behavioural criteria here, Parfit might say, are satisfied 
by the subsequent organism (with my brain now transplanted) speaking and telling us that he retained 
consciousness. We can even vary the example to make it less objectionable to someone persuaded by 
the Wittgensteinian dictum, by imagining that I was given an anaesthetic prior to the operation and on 
waking up in the new body I state that I remember being given the anaesthetic “when I was in the old 
body”.47 In such cases, Parfit may contend, there is no problem whatsoever in saying that, in the interim 
period, the brain was conscious (on the first version of the scenario) or unconscious (on the second 
version of the scenario). And if, indeed, it is true to say that only of a being that can be conscious does 
it make sense to say that it is unconscious, then on either of these scenarios, we have a case where we 
can truly say of the brain that that brain was me, and, as that brain, I was conscious or unconscious 
while I waited for the transfer to the new organism. Since this makes sense (so it would be argued), and 
since my identity is preserved throughout on this scenario, it seems to follow that I am my brain. 
In reply, I believe it would be wrong to say in such a case that I am a brain, or was my brain at least 
during that period the brain was kept alive in the jar. If we indulge the fantasy, we might instead say 
that I was reduced entirely to the state of having only potentialities, as I was when I was an embryo. 
But this no more shows that I am the brain now than does the fact that, on some views, I was once an 
embryo show that I am now essentially an embryo. Furthermore, without the organism, it is highly 
doubtful that the brain could really be conscious of anything – all the perceptual capacities would be 
absent, for instance. Even if we accept “it can think” on the behavioural criteria that might on the above 
argument be suggested by Parfit, this does not show that it is the brain that thinks (and note that “it can 
think” is already a grammatical revision). It only shows that because the human being whose brain was 
removed could think, the brain, detached from the human being, might be able to exercise in a residual 
way some of the capacities, to some extent, that the human being could exercise, for a short period of 
time thereafter.  
I contend that, in order to say that it is really our brain doing all these things, we would have to be able 
to imagine “teaching a brain”48 from birth to do all the things the human being can do – it is not sufficient 
to start with the human being first, and then extract the human being away by these thought experiments 
while tacitly relying on the capacities for whose development and exercise the behavioural repertoire 
of the human being is a precondition. Since I could not have developed to be the person I am without 
being the organism that I am, I cannot be identified with my brain. It is true that I could not have 
developed to be the person I am without my brain either, but that is why I am the whole human organism, 
including brain and body. So peeling off the body, as it were, after the features that give me my 
distinctive personhood and personality have developed, does not suffice to show that I am a brain, 
notwithstanding that I might survive, in rudimentary form, in the experiment just discussed.  
III.B Is the Pronoun "I" Systematically Ambiguous?  
 
Parfit has very recently argued that the personal pronoun “I” may be systematically ambiguous, 
referring at times to what he calls “Outer I”, the human organism (as when I say I am sunburnt all over), 
and at other times to what he calls “Inner I”, my conscious part (as when I say “I have been thinking 
about an abstract problem”) (Parfit, 2012, 21-24). This might seem to resolve the logical problems that 
otherwise flow from identifying us with regions of the brain. For, on this view, “I can see” would mean 
“Outer I can see”, whereas “I am thinking” means “Inner I am thinking”.  
One immediate difficulty, however, with this claim is that, as Wittgenstein pointed out, a word has a 
meaning we have given it (Wittgenstein, 1958, 27-28), and we cannot milk any more out of it than we 
put in. In order for the word to be ambiguous, there must therefore already be a recognised meaning 
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that the word has been given that would, for example, be recorded in standard dictionaries such as the 
Oxford English Dictionary. Otherwise, Parfit’s claim is no more than a recommendation to give the 
word a new meaning, one it currently does not bear, thereby creating the ambiguity whose existence he 
purports to be reporting.49 This is, I think, a significant problem for his theory. But suppose we accept 
his theory as a recommendation, instead. The difficulties for his position are not solved. For we must 
now ask: what are the criteria for stating that “part of my brain, or Inner I, is thinking about an abstract 
philosophical problem”? If they are our normal criteria – eg, A’s head is cupped in his hands and he is 
frowning with concentration as he sits in silence thinking about it – the recommendation reduces to no 
more than one for a change of label (“I think” being replaced with the label “Inner I thinks”). No 
different fact is thereby recorded at all.50 For Parfit’s argument to count as more than a merely verbal 
procedure, there must be something, some criterion, over and above our normal criteria for the 
application of “he’s thinking intently about this”, for the change he recommends to be genuine – some 
way we can meaningfully ascribe the thinking to the relevant part of the brain, but not to the whole 
animal or organism. And this is extremely difficult to cite. If Parfit cites, for example, electrical 
impulses, or other activity in the brain such as might appear through imaging techniques such as PET 
or fMRI, this still would not show that it is the brain (or relevant region of it) that thinks. For, as Bennett 
and Hacker have pointed out, what is observed via PET or fMRI is the brain activity of the subject 
performing the tasks that the subject is invited to perform (we do not observe the brain performing 
those tasks, for “perform” can only be used of the subject, on the basis of the subject’s behavioural 
criteria) (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, 83). So it is the human being that we are witnessing engage in 
inferring, thinking, seeing, hearing, etc, not the brain – in looking at the image produced by the scan, 
we are merely looking at the brain activity that occurs when the human being is thinking, etc. To 
discover the brain doing things, which would not amount merely to the enabling conditions of an 
organism doing these things, we would surely need to see the brain doing something while the human 
being whose brain it is is not doing those things. But no such criteria are forthcoming. But without the 
criteria, the recommendation is one merely of a change of label (from talk of the human being doing x 
to the brain doing x). 
Could we not say, however, that the brain activity that we witness via PET or fMRI is thinking, seeing, 
hearing, etc, and that these imaging techniques are another way of having access to someone’s thinking, 
etc? If so, have we not shown what it means to say that it is really the brain that thinks, sees, and hears? 
This temptation is especially acute when we consider that we might rely on activity in the brain in the 
case of minimally conscious patients as the only way of telling whether they are in a state of 
consciousness or not. But Bennett and Hacker (2003, 84) have argued that the correlation here is 
inductive, rather than criterial, which means that we already need to know what, eg., thinking is – what 
counts as thinking – in order then to correlate the activity in the brain with (what we call) thinking 
(Bennett and Hacker, 2003, 84). A logical consequence of this point is that we do not discover what 
thinking is – how would we know what to look for if we did not already know what thinking is? – but 
rather we discover what makes thinking possible, i.e., the enabling conditions that make it possible for 
the organism to exercise the powers or capacities to think and reflect, etc.  
This is confirmed by a very simple logical point that Bennett and Hacker make in the context of the use 
of these scanners to observe patterns in the brain when the subject is in pain: if evidence from the 
imaging techniques suggests that the patient is in pain, but the patient sincerely insists that he or she is 
not, the evidence from the imaging techniques is defeated (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, 83). We apply 
our concept of pain – with its associated behavioural criteria (here, the sincere insistence that he or she 
is not in pain) – to determine whether the imaging is accurate, rather than the reverse. The same points 
would apply if scientists started to claim that such techniques could decipher the content of our thoughts. 
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We already presuppose our concept of thinking as it applies to the organism as a whole when we 
undertake these experiments, and, at most, we are inductively correlating the patterns we see via a 
scanner with the thinking that the subject is doing. If the subject sincerely says that he is not thinking, 
then the evidence on the scanner is defeated. The subject’s own sincere expression of whether he or she 
is thinking, and what he or she is thinking about, is the final court of appeal. But if it were the brain that 
thinks and feels, as shown through the scanner, then this would not be the case. Instead, we would have 
to say that the subject is wrong, and that the brain is thinking, or thinking about a particular thing (a trip 
to London, say), even when the subject denies this. But we do not do this.51 Our not doing so tacitly 
shows that we do not really ascribe thinking to the brain, but rather to the organism. To ascribe it to the 
brain, instead, would change what we mean by thinking, because it would change the criteria for its 
application. No reason, however, has been disclosed for us to change our way of speaking, and to start 
referring to the brain as the real thinker, as opposed to the organism.  
One final problem with identifying what Parfit calls “Inner I” with the so called conscious part of my 
brain is this. The expression “I am conscious” would be a tautology, for it would mean “my conscious 
part is conscious”. And whose conscious part is my conscious part? What does the word “my” mean in 
“my conscious part”? We cannot say it means the conscious part of me, where “me” refers to the 
organism, for the organism does not have a conscious part. Rather, the brain does so, and the brain has 
been distinguished from the organism by both McMahan and Parfit (it being an organ not an organism). 
But we cannot say that it means the conscious part of me, where “me” refers to the conscious part of 
the brain, for that would yield the nonsensical: “my conscious part’s conscious part”. Spelling out the 
logico-grammatical consequences of any such recommendation in this way is likely to make us less 
inclined to accept Parfit’s proposal.  
IV. Conclusion 
McMahan’s claim that we are not human organisms appears to question the obvious. But because it is 
a philosophical claim, the fact that it questions the obvious is no objection, for, traditionally, questioning 
the obvious has been considered a virtue of the subject. Nonetheless, once the arguments of McMahan 
for the conclusion that we are not human organisms, but merely the conscious part of the organism, are 
subjected to critical scrutiny, it can be seen, in my view, that they are found wanting. The claim that we 
are not human beings arises principally from a misconstrual of the implications, for our self-
understanding, of the possibility that our world could be different in a number of alternative ways – 
each of which might mean that we would adopt different concepts of personhood and personal identity 
for that particular world. The resultant self-understanding would be different in each case. If I am right, 
then those possibilities do not have any bearing on our self-understanding in this world, and we can 
continue to classify ourselves as human beings in our world. Accordingly, McMahan has not shown 
that we are not human beings in our world, and his arguments therefore cannot be used in support of 
the claim that, since the embryo is an organism, but we are not, we are not killed when an embryo is 
killed. For the same reasons, they cannot support the further claim that stem cell research should be 
permitted. Other arguments for that conclusion would need to be relied on, but I shall not pursue those 
arguments in this paper. Neither can McMahan’s arguments support the conclusion that PVS patients 
are dead even though the PVS organism is alive. This has implications for McMahan’s endorsement of 
the upper brain criterion of death and his ethical arguments concerning the use of PVS patients and 
other patients whose upper brain has died, as potential sources of organs. McMahan claims that in PVS, 
“cerebral death has occurred, but the brainstem remains intact and functional.” “Thus”, he continues, 
“although the organism remains alive, the person has died or ceased to exist” (McMahan, 2002, 440). 
He then claims that “we should assign the living organism in a PVS much the same status as we now 
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assign a dead human organism” (McMahan, 2002, 447). I believe that my arguments above invalidate 
this claim to the extent that it is based on McMahan’s two arguments and therefore on his view that we 
are already defined as the conscious part of the organism. To that extent, the upper brain criterion for 
declaring death is not, in my view, a valid criterion for death. In my view, the use of such patients would 
be a clear violation of the dead donor rule. In this paper, I have tried to expose what I believe to be the 
faulty metaphysical thinking that has led McMahan to these ethical views. 
 
NOTES 
1 In this paper, “human being” and “human organism” will be used interchangeably.  
2 I leave aside here the more esoteric possibility that we are souls (ensouling, or being attached to, the embryo 
from conception), which McMahan (2007) discusses and dismisses. For reasons of space, I cannot examine that 
possibility in this paper, but it seems to me that before we can ask whether the claim that we are souls is true or 
false, we should first need to know what counts as “being a soul” and how a soul might be “attached” to, or 
“ensoul” the embryo. These questions concern questions of meaning because, if the soul is conceived of as a 
non-physical entity, it is not clear what it would mean for a “non-physical” entity to be “attached” to a physical 
entity. For discussion of these and similar issues, see Rundle (2004). 
3 The argument represents a modification of his earlier view in Reasons and Persons. I will not pursue the 
subtleties of those differences here. 
4 Parfit cites this argument and endorses it in Parfit (2012, 14, 17). 
5 Note, once again, the qualification in note 2 which I leave aside here. 
6 It may also come from his taking the criterion of “spatiotemporal continuant” to be decisive, for there is only 
one spatio-temporal continuant, one biological mass, in such a case. See Campbell and McMahan (2010). I 
discuss this point below. 
7 Or at least with the body below the neck. But “organism” does not refer to the body below the neck, but to the 
whole entity, and so includes the head. As such, it would be nonsense to say that two heads sit atop a single 
body where “body” means organism – that only makes sense if the word “body” refers to the torso or trunk.  
8 Derek Parfit may very recently have made a similar mistake when suggesting that “we are embodied heads” 
(Parfit, 2012, 17). The head is part of the body, in the sense of organism, and so we can no more be embodied 
heads than we can be embodied bodies. At most, we could be embodied brains – and I shall discuss this 
suggestion below. 
9 As McMahan (2002, 36) himself concedes. 
10 See note 6. He also refers to “a single biological life” that supports “the existence and thus the lives of two 
distinct persons” (McMahan, 2002, 37). But “single biological life” is compatible with there being two 
impartially severed organisms present. Here McMahan trades on an ambiguity between “single spatio-temporal 
continuant” and “single organism”.  
11 Alternatively, we can simply say that they are numerically distinct in one sense (we can count the squares) but 
not in another (they are part of one bar). Just as we leave this issue open and don’t consider there to be a 
problem in referring to distinct squares and one bar, so we can refer to distinct, incompletely severed organisms 
but one biological mass.  
12 For the possibility of drawing a different conclusion than the one McMahan draws from these two 
considerations, see Mulhall (2002). 
13 Whether we would make the particular choice McMahan believes we should would depend on the coherence 
or otherwise of the proposal with the rest of our conceptual scheme.  
14 In making this point, I have relied on Hacker (2007, 306) and Glock and Hyman (1994), who discuss the 
famous thought experiment in the context of a discussion of Bernard Williams’s criticisms of P F Strawson’s 
Individuals. The following arguments attempt to develop the point. 
15 It is sometimes claimed that the concept of personhood and the concept of personal identity are separate 
issues. We can ignore this claim for now. On the views being here considered, if I stop being a person, it is not 
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strictly I who does so, but only “my organism”. My identity is therefore tightly bound up with what I am on 
these views. On these accounts, I can’t become a different human being because I am not a human being; I am a 
brain (more precisely, I am those parts of the brain in which consciousness is realised). And I cannot become a 
different brain on these views. There is, of course, a distinction between qualitative and numerical identity: the 
possibility of A becoming a different creature (say turning from a human being into a frog) or even of A 
becoming a different thing altogether (Lot’s wife becoming a pillar of salt, see Broyles (1985, 59)). We can 
imagine one spatio-temporal continuant transforming from one kind of thing into another kind of thing and we 
can say of that spatio-temporal continuant that it was so transformed. If we do, we can say that that thing is now 
something else, meaning only that it is qualitatively different. In this sense, the identity question does come 
apart from the nature of the thing question. But there are conceptual limits to such possibilities – it is doubtful, 
contra Broyles, that there is one underlying thing that remains “self-identical” in the case of Lot’s wife 
transforming into a pillar of salt, of which the human being and the salt are mere phases. When wine is 
transformed into vinegar, the wine no longer exists. But wine is a substance, not a phase of some other 
substance (thanks to Peter Hacker for this example).  
16 Note that if the resultant person did not claim to be me and had none of my memories, etc, we would be far 
less tempted to claim that the resultant person is me. 
17 We shall see later that one reason for this is that there would be two people claiming to be the same person, 
and the transitivity of identity rules out two people being one and the same person. Some philosophers think that 
if I died immediately before the twin claimed to be me, we might in that case claim that the twin is me. Parfit’s 
psychological continuity account might lead to this view, though it is worth noting that his claim that 
psychological continuity is not identity (identity being psychological continuity plus the no-branching 
requirement), means that Parfit is not himself committed to this view. This distinction between psychological 
continuity without the no-branching requirement and psychological continuity with the no-branching 
requirement is what enables Parfit to claim that identity is not what matters, and also enables him to bypass the 
transitivity of identity problem. These moves are all, however, redefinitions of our concepts of personal identity 
and personhood based on imaginary hypothetical possibilities which, were they to occur, would result in a 
breakdown and shift of our current concepts of personhood and personal identity. It is far from clear what 
implications these imaginary cases really have for “what matters”, given the world we actually live in. 
18 I owe this way of expressing the point to Peter Hacker. 
19 McMahan speaks of organisms in PVS as “unoccupied” (McMahan, 2002, 443). 
20 I here adopt only McMahan’s own way of expressing this point – I don’t myself endorse the view that we are 
“those parts of the brain in which consciousness is realised”. 
21 I owe this point, and the reference to Wiggins, to Peter Hacker. 
22 I assume that the possibilities I am entertaining here are meaningful, for the sake of argument. But it is 
doubtful that “programming the brain with memories” is a meaningful proposition: a picture of programming 
computers is transferred to the brain while all the differences are dropped to make the picture seem compelling. 
For formidable criticism of the view that we can transfer memories, see Schechtman (1990). 
23 This way of imagining the next scenario is misleading, because it implies that the brain controls our bodies 
but this is not so. It makes no sense to speak of the brain controlling the body.  
24 Note that it might in that case then make sense to speak of possessing a body in the way that, in our current 
conceptual scheme, it does not. As Hacker notes, under our current conceptual scheme, to have a body is not a 
relationship of possession. Rather, talk of having a body is merely a way of referring to the corporeal 
characteristics of the human organism. See Hacker (2007, 269-284). 
25 Note how our grammar has already shifted in this imagined case. In our grammar, it makes no sense to say 
that heads communicate with each other. We have to imagine a case for such a combination of words to acquire 
a sense.  
26 Hacker (2007, 308) makes this suggestion. 
27 The point derives from Wittgenstein (1958, 62). 
28 Such a scenario would require more than transplantation between twins of course.  
29 See Hacker (2007, 310) for a comment to this effect in discussion of the thought experiment generally. 
30 See Glock and Hyman (1994) from whom I have taken this point. It derives, however, from Wittgenstein 
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(1958). 
31 Where is the line drawn between a symptom and a criterion in the case of bodily continuity?, Parfit might ask. 
We can imagine starting with the finger prints and progressively removing the rest of the body, leaving only the 
head.  
32 Gender reassignment surgery might seem to cast doubt on this claim. The same person, after all, was male 
and now is female, or vice versa. But of course, in such cases, one and the same body is changed, and it remains 
numerically identical to itself throughout. That is not so, however, in the transplant example.  
33 There are empirical grounds for contesting the claim that I discuss later. 
34 The papers of Merker (2007) and Shewmon, Holmes and Byrne (1999) are briefly discussed by Miller and 
Truog (2012) in support of their criticism of the higher brain standard of death. 
35 Even if this should not prove to be so with adults, the cases of hydranencephaly should give us pause, and we 
can imaginatively vary the findings concerning the vertical plasticity of the brain stem to generate problems for 
Parfit’s own imagined cases (see below). 
36 This directly parallels what is currently known to happen in the case of single hemispheres, which take on 
some of the capacities of the one destroyed. 
37 This point extends beyond the mere organism/person contrast. Assume chimpanzees are not persons. Are 
chimpanzees organisms or merely the conscious part of “their” organism? McMahan would say that they are the 
conscious part of their organism. The same issues would apply if we conducted similar thought experiments in 
the case of chimpanzees.  
38 It is often questioned whether a PVS patient is a person rather than merely a living organism. This can be 
answered by a question: is a television set that has lost its picture a television set, or merely an electrical device? 
39 Henceforth “brain” should be understood, as McMahan himself says, as shorthand for the relevant regions of 
the brain that McMahan understands as the “conscious part” that, according to McMahan, we are. 
40 See Bennett and Hacker (2003, 445): “There are no criteria for whether the brain is conscious of this or that, 
only inductive correlations between brain states and the animal’s being conscious, unconscious, or transitively 
conscious of this or that feature of its environment, or in one or another state of consciousness”. 
41 See Hacker (2007, 53) who also cites Wiggins (1995, 227) in support of this claim. 
42 A similar point applies to the claim made by Parfit (2012, 12), that the brain might survive outside the body. 
Presumably, to survive, it would continue needing a blood supply, and once this is provided, we introduce 
things other than the brain, so it is really the brain and these other things that are jointly the enabling conditions 
for consciousness to continue. And once that step is taken, we can say that it is still not the brain, that is, the 
organ, that is conscious, but the entity consisting of the brain plus that which supplies blood to it. Would this 
not at least show we are not organisms? It would only show that we might then redefine ourselves perhaps as 
something which is the heir of the human organism. But it wouldn’t show that we are essentially brains, or the 
part of the brain in which consciousness is realised. 
43 For the following points about behavioural criteria, I am once again indebted to the work of Peter Hacker 
(2007). For readers concerned that this account amounts to a form of behaviourism, see Hacker’s rebuttal 
(Hacker, 1996, 254). 
44 John Searle, in debate with Bennett and Hacker (2007) has pointed out that it is possible to be conscious and 
not show it. Bennett and Hacker concede this. An animal does not have to exhibit such behaviour in order to be 
conscious. But they insist that the concept of consciousness is bound up with the behavioural grounds for 
ascribing it to a being (Bennett et al 2007, 135). Only a being capable of showing consciousness, is capable of 
not showing it. Hence when a being is conscious but does not show it, it might be acting like a stone, but it is 
not equivalent to a stone, for stones are not capable of showing consciousness (and so are incapable of not 
showing it either). Similarly, those with locked in syndrome did at one stage show it, and so are the kinds of 
beings it makes sense to say that they are not capable of showing it – something has gone wrong, which is why 
they can no longer show it (except via the movements of the eyelids, which are still behavioural grounds for the 
expression of their consciousness and thought). 
45 Parfit (2012, 20), for example, expressly rejects the captain in the ship analogy. 
46 Cf Hacker (2007, 306) who claims that to say that it is the brain that thinks, sees, hears, etc, is like saying that 
it is the jet engine that flies, rather than the aeroplane. 
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47 But note once again how much grammar has now shifted: we are now speaking of my “being in” an old body, 
and the like. These ways of speaking our excluded by our current rules. It makes no sense to say that I am “in” a 
body, though I can feel comfortable in my skin.  
48 It is not at all clear, however, what could count as teaching a brain as opposed to the human being anything. 
49 Parfit would respond to this contention by insisting that the word is already ambiguous: when I refer to being 
sunburnt all over, I am talking about my body. When I refer to thinking about a problem, by contrast, I am 
referring to me, whatever I may be. This reply, however, begs the question. As Hacker has argued, when I say 
that I am sunburnt all over, I am speaking of myself - this living human being. When I say that my body is 
sunburnt all over, I am speaking of one of my somatic characteristics. 
50 Hacker has noted that what we should say is that, since these are criteria for a human being’s thinking, they 
could only be used as criteria for the human being’s brain to be in whatever state it is when the human being is 
thinking – and only that would be what it would then mean to say that my brain is thinking (personal 
communication). 
51 It is also worth bearing in mind that scientific research has shown that pattern activation in the brain “that 
attends speech is largely indifferent to the content of what is said or meant, and to whether it is spoken or merely 
mentally rehearsed” (Nachev and Hacker, 2010, 70). This paper cites studies by Nachev, Kennard and Husain, 
and by Picard and Strick. This research tends to contravene the otherwise natural intuition that there must be some 
one to one correlation between activity in the brain and the behaviour that we go on when we ascribe the exercise 
of capacities such as thinking and speaking to the human being. 
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